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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section

78-2-2

from

a

Summary

Judgment

dismissing

Plaintiffs1 Complaint which was entered June 23, 1986 by the
District Court for the Second Judicial District, Hon. Rodney
S. Page presiding.

The Judgment incorporated two rulings on

Defendant Clearfield City's Motions for Summary Judgment.
In the first ruling, issued December 17, 1985, the District
Court ruled that Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 as
amended

barred

Plaintiffs1

cause

of action; refused

to

consider the retroactive application of U.C.A. 63-30-3 as
amended; found that the City was not estopped to claim the
defense of governmental immunity by reason of payments made
to Plaintiffs before suit was filed; and allowed Plaintiffs
to amend their Complaint to state a cause of action under
Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah.
Following a hearing on Defendant's second Motion
for Summary Judgment on January 30, 1986, the District Court
ruled on April 29, 1986 that Plaintiffs had not suffered a
taking of their property and inverse condemnation was not
applicable; that Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution
of Utah is not self-executing; and that Utah Code Annotated
63-30-3 as amended precluded suit under Article I, Section
22 of the Constitution and under U.C.A. 63-30-9, and should

be applied retroactively.
on

June

23,

1986

Judgment was entered accordingly
Plaintiffs1

dismissing

Complaint

with

prejudice.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In

19753

Plaintiffs

Rick

and

Cherlynn

Hamblin

purchased their home at 576 North Barlow Street, Clearfield,
Davis County, and they have resided there continually since
that time. (Record pages 1, 29, 58).
Several years after Plaintiffs moved
home,

in

1978

or

1979,

construction

of

subdivision commenced near Plaintiffs1 home.

into their

Green

Hills

New homes are

still being added to the subdivision (Record page 29).

As

part of the construction of the Green Hills subdivision,
Defendant

Clearfield

City

permitted

the

contractor

to

elevate the property surrounding Plaintiffs1 home and change
the grade or slope of the property
Defendant

City also

allowed

the

(Record pages 29-30).

construction

of a

storm

system which channels all water draining from Green Hills
subdivision

to

a

point

in

front

of

and

uphill

from

Plaintiffs* home (Record pages 30, 58).
Plaintiffs began to experience flooding of their
property for the first time in May of 1981, and have been
flooded regularly since that date whenever there are heavy

-3-

rains (Record pages 2, 30-32, 50-58, 63-64).

Plaintiffs are

flooded at times when no other homes in the area experience
flooding.
Clearfield City reconstructed the intersection in
front of Plaintiffs1 home in an attempt to alleviate the
flooding, but the flooding continued.
1983,

the

energy

City

constructed

dispatcher

north

a

In or about November,

larger

catch

of Plaintifffs

basin

and

home, which

an

also

failed to alleviate the flooding (Record pages 2, 58).
Defendant City reimbursed Plaintiffs for expenses
incidental to cleanup of their property through October of
1984,

and

paid

driveway,
expenses
pages

but

has

caused

50-57,

for

by

some

repair

refused

to

flooding

63, 70).

work

on

reimburse

since

Defendant

the

yard

and

Plaintiffs

for

October,
has

1984

never

(Record

compensated

Plaintiffs for the permanent damage to their home caused by
flooding (Record pages 48, 102-103).
Despite continued promises from Clearfield City to
correct

the

problem

and

prevent

flooding

of

Plaintiffs1

home, the City has done nothing since 1983 to prevent the
periodic flooding.
to correct
delayed

the

filing

Plaintiffs relied on the City's promises

problem

and

suit until

prevent

future

1985, although

flooding, and
they

had

been

flooded consistently since 1981 (Record page 45).
Because of the continued flooding, Plaintiffs have

been

forced

property*

to

take

time

off

work

to

clean

up

their

Their yard has been damaged, the foundation of

the home weakened and cracked, the concrete of the driveway
and garage damaged, the top soil of the yard washed away.
Water and mud flow into the house when flooding occurs and
the musty

smell

remains

after

cleaning.

Plaintiffs

and

their children now dread living in the home, but they have
been unable to sell it in its current state (Record pages 2,
48-51, 60, 63-64).
Plaintiffs filed suit against Clearfield City on
April 10, 1985, basing their cause of action on Utah Code
Annotated
refused

Sections

63-30-8

to reimburse

and

9,

after

Defendant

City

them for damages caused by flooding

which occurred November 8, 1984, and refused to either pay
for further repairs necessitated by years of flood damage or
make Plaintiffs whole for the permanent damage done to their
home property by flooding.

(Record pages

1-3, 48, 102,

103.)
Defendant
Judgment.

City

filed

a

Motion

for

Summary

In the ruling on that motion, issued December 17,

1985, the District Court ruled that Plaintiffs' action was
barred by Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 as amended.
In

the

same

Plaintiffs

ruling,

the

District

to amend their complaint

Court

also

to state

allowed

a cause

of

action for inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22

<=;_

of the Constitution of Utah-

(Record pages 27, 91, 92,

106-107.)
After
Motion

for

hearing

Summary

arguments

Judgment

on

on

Defendant's

January

District Court in a ruling issued April
Defendant's

motion.

Subsequently,

30,

second

1986,

the

29, 1986 granted

on

June

23,

1986,

Judgment was entered dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with
prejudice.

(Record pages 93, 130, 148-153, 162-163.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs will show that the action of Clearfield
City has caused continuing flooding of their property, which
amounts to a taking of their property without the exercise
of eminent domain.

Plaintiffs claim the benefit of Article

I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah, which guarantees
compensation for "taking11 or "damage" of property, under the
theory

of

inverse

condemnation.

This

constitutional

provision has been held to be self-executing, requiring no
further

statutory

consent to suit, by most

jurisdictions

with similar provisions and there is Utah precedent for such
a holding.
The
condemnation

constitutionally-based
is

generally

held

to

theory
be

an

of

inverse

exception

to

governmental immunity, and the Legislature by amending Utah

Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 could not use governmental
immunity as a bar to compensation required by Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution (as applied to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment).
The

amendment

to

Utah

Code

Annotated

63-30-3 should not be applied retroactively
cause of action which

arose

years

before

Section

to cut off a
the amendment,

particularly when the events giving rise to the amendment
were totally unforeseeable and sporadic, in contrast to the
continued flooding experienced by Plaintiffs.

The amendment

did not embody existing case law, and in the absence of a
specific directive

in the

statute

should

not

be

applied

retroactively.
Since the Legislature has done nothing to change
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-9, it is still valid law
and

should

be

applied

to

the

instant

action despite

an

apparent conflict with U.C.A. Section 63-30-3 as amended*
Defendant City, by its action in paying some claims, showed
that

it

Plaintiffs

considered
relied

on

U.C.A.

63-30-9

Defendant's

to

be

payments

valid.
and

As

promises,

Defendant City should now be estopped to claim the defense
of governmental immunity.

-7-

ARGUMENT

POINT I

ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT
CLEARFIELD CITY COMPENSATE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE
TAKING OF THEIR PROPERTY.

Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah
states, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation."

Many other states

have simiLar provisions in their constitutions; and the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
concludes with the words "...nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."

These

provisions provide a limitation on the power of eminent
domain, since they require that compensation be paid for
property taken by a governmental or quasi-governmental body.
But the eminent domain statutes have no provision for an
action by the owner of private property if a body with the
power of eminent domain takes (or damages) private property
without exercising that power.

To fill this vacuum, the

courts of many states, including Utah, have traditionally
allowed a property owner to sue for the just compensation
guaranteed by the Constitutions of Utah and of the United

States, under a theory most commonly referred to as inverse
condemnation.
While the Utah Supreme Court has never used the
term "inverse condemnation", it has recognized and upheld
the principal of inverse condemnation.

The Court said, in

Hampton v. State, 21 U.2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1969) that even
such a property right as the right of access, light, or air
"cannot

be

so embarrassed

or

abridged

as

to

materially

interfere with its proper use and enjoyment11 (445 P.2d at
710) without due compensation.

In Hampton, the plaintiffs

claimed that as part of the construction of 1-15
Clearfield,

the

State

Road

Commission

through

substantially

interfered with their right of access to their property.
The trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign
immunity, but the Supreme Court held that "insofar as they
allege a substantial and material impairment of access to
their property, constituting a taking," (445 P.2d at 712), a
claim for "taking" could
immunity.

not

be

dismissed

The Court reversed and remanded

for

sovereign

to allow

the

plaintiffs to prove that there had been a "taking".
In Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah, 221, 120 P.
503 (1911), Salt Lake City lowered the grade of the street
in front of the plaintifffs home by several feet, removing
the soil supporting her retaining wall, and preventing the
convenient ingress and egress plaintiff had earlier enjoyed.

-9-

This substantial interference with plaintiff's use of the
property, which reduced

her market

taking

for

of

the

property

which

value, amounted
plaintiff

was

to a

awarded

compensation even though she still had possession of her
home

and

the

City

had

never

instituted

eminent

domain

proceedings.
The Court held in Hubble v. Cache County Drainage
District No. 3, 120 Utah, 651, 237 P.2d 843 (1951) that a
drainage district created by statute (which had the power of
eminent domain) could not increase its system or facilities
so as to create additional burdens on the land of those
outside

the

district

subdivision) without

(or,

by

responding

extension,

outside

in damages, resorting

eminent domain, or being the subject of

an

the
to

injunction.

Hubble imposes on any body with the power of eminent domain
the responsibility to compensate for property taken by its
actions.
Plaintiff

N.

Rick

Hamblin

testified

deposition regarding the effects of the flooding:
Also, I have mud and water come into my
house.
The house has a musty smell.
Right at this point on the northeast
corner of the home the foundation is
cracking. We never had any cracking up
until one year ago.
The cement is
sinking inside the garage.
There are
cracks all over inside of the garage.
There are pieces of cement falling off
of
the
house
underneath
the
one
window... ." Record, page 48.

in

his

Plaintiffs

have

previously

replaced

a

damaged

driveway and restored washed-out landscaping.

concrete

Every time it

rains heavily, they are flooded and must take time off work
to clean up the property.

The worsening, permanent damage

to the house, the persistent dank smell, and the anxiety of
living in a house which they know will be flooded again, has
reduced
ff

dream

the value
home11

Plaintiffs1

of

into

a

home, and

ff

nightmaren

Plaintiffs have experienced

such

(record,

turned
page

substantial

their

48).

interference

with their use of the home that they have tried to sell it
and move out, because they do not feel they can safely and
comfortably

live

in the home.

However, they

have

been

unable to sell the home.
Because inverse condemnation

and

suits are based on the same constitutional
issues and the principles governing
same for both types of cases.

eminent

domain

provision, the

those issues are the

The California Supreme Court

has so held, in Breidert v. South P. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659,
663 n.I, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903, 905 n.I, 394 P.2d 719, 721 n.I
(1964).

Thus,

the

standards

for

compensable

damage

or

taking and for the amount of compensation are the same for
inverse condemnation suits and eminent domain actions.
State v. Williams, 22 U.2d 331, 452 P.2d
property

owner

in

an

eminent

domain

881

action

In

(1969), the
was

denied

compensation for the depreciation to his property caused by
-11-

increased

noise.

In affirming,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

reiterated its position that Article I, Section 22 of the
Constitution "means that some physical injury or damage to
the property itself shall be committed, and does not include
something which merely affects the senses of the persons who
use

the

property."

452

P.2d

at

883.

See

also

Twenty-Second Corporation of Church, etc., v. Oregon Short
Line Railroad, 36 Utah, 238, 103 P. 243, 23 L.R.A. , N.S.
860.

The Plaintiffs herein have experienced physical injury

to their property, a fact which Defendant
has

never

denied

and

instead

tacitly

Clearfield
acknowledged

City
by

reimbursing Plaintiffs for some of the repairs undertaken by
Plaintiffs. The Court in Williams went on to say that the
constitutional standard for recoverable damages was met:
"... where there has been some physical
disturbance of a right, either public or
private, which the owner enjoys in
connection with his property and which
gives it additional value, and which
causes him to sustain a special damage
with repect to his property in excess of
that sustained by the public generally.
It requires a definite physical injury
cognizable
to
the
senses
with
a
perceptible effect on the present market
value; such as drying up wells and
springs, destroying lateral supports,
preventing surface waters from running
off adjacent lands or running surface
waters onto adjacent lands, or the
depositing of cinders and other foreign
materials on neighboring lands by the
permanent operation of the business or
improvement established on the adjoining

lands." Emphasis added. 452 P.2d 881,
883-884, quoting Board of Education of
Logan City School District v. Croft, O"
U.2d 310, 373 P.2d 697, 699.
In both the Williams and Croft cases, there was no
physical disturbance, but there can be no doubt that the
Hamblins

have

experienced

property rights.

physical

disturbance

of

their

The Court, in Reeder v. Brigham City, 17

U.2d 298, 413 P.2d 300 (1966), while affirming an injunction
against Brigham City, held that a property owner "has the
right to be free from receiving waters on his lands to his
damage which do not find their way in their natural course
and

under

natural

conditions.ff

413

P. 2d

at

302.

The

Hamblins lived in their home for at least five years before
they

were

flooded.

The

flooding

only

began

natural grade of the land around the Hamblins*

after

the

home was

changed, and the natural course of water draining from that
neighboring property altered

so as

to

channel

all water

draining from the new subdivision to the Hamblins' property.
Clearfield City clearly had the authority to take
the Hamblins1 property via the exercise of eminent domain,
but the City was and is unwilling to pay the Hamblins for
the house and lot, or to compensate them for the irreparable
damage done.

Surely there could be no more direct damage

than in this case, where the Plaintiffs1 house and property
are

being

destroyed

around

them by

channeled to flow to their property.

-1 1-

waters

intentionally

The Hamblins1

home

will inevitably become uninhabitable, if it has not already
reached that stage.
Plaintiffs

in

The City, which has a duty to protect

their

safe

enjoyment

of

their

home,

has

instead become the instrument depriving them of the use and
enjoyment of their property.

Having in effect, if not in

fact, condemned Plaintiffs1 property, Defendant City should
be required to compensate Plaintiffs for their loss.
POINT II
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22, REQUIRING THAT DEFENDANT
CITY COMPENSATE PLAINTIFFS, IS SELF EXECUTING.
Webber v. Salt Lake City, supra, and the cases
which followed
Article

it did

I, Section

not

22

of

question
the

the

Constitution

self-executing, requiring no further
suit.

proposition
of

that

Utah

was

statutory consent to

Approximately half the states of the United States

have similar constitutional provisions, and the overwhelming
majority

of those

self-executing.

states

consider

such

provisions

to be

See Judge Bullockfs dissent to Andrus v.

State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1123 n. 5 for a list of the states
with similar constitutional provisions and n. 6 for a list
of those which consider them self-executing.
Arvo Van Alstyne, in an article which

"explores

the extent to which public liability in inverse condemnation
may,

conformably

to

the

United

States

Constitution,

modified and regulated by state constitutional

^14-

be

changes or

enactments11

statutory
California

has

stated

constitutional

repeatedly

provision

which

that

provides

the
that

"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation having first been made to, or
paid

into

court

for,

the

owner...

."

is

self-executing by the courts of California.

considered

Van Alstyne,

Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of
Legislative Power, 19 Stan.L.Rev. 727, 729 (1967); Article
I, Section 14, Constitution of California.
He

goes

so

far

as

to

say

that, following

the

enactment of California's Tort Claims Act which purports to
cut

off

"injured

some

tort

property

actions
owners

against
may

be

government
expected

bodies,
to

redress—-and thus circumvent legislative policy—by
to the self-executing constitutional remedy".

seek
resort

Van Alstyne,

op. cit. at 741.
Nevertheless,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court,

without

overruling Webber, held in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County,
10 U.2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960) that Article I, Section 22
of the Constitution of Utah was not self-executing, and that
in order to recover in an action for inverse condemnation, a
plaintiff

would

have

to

rely

on

a

statute,

state's consent to suit in addition to the
provision.

giving

the

constitutional

Even the Fairclough case did not bar recovery

altogether under inverse condemnation; thus, in Hampton v*
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State, 21 U.2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1969) the Court allowed
recovery by plaintiffs who relied on Article I, Section 22
and a statute (now re-enacted as Utah Code Annotated 1953
Section 63-30-6) which gave consent to a suit "for recovery
of any property real or personal or for the possession
thereof or to quiet title thereto... ."
Despite

vigorous

dissents

in

Fairclough

and

following cases, the Court has in recent years insisted that
Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah is not
self-executing, without overruling the earlier cases which
held otherwise.

So there is, in fact, precedent in Utah for

both positions.
Surely

the

constitutional

provision

is

no

protection if the Legislature can cut off the right of
recovery at any time.

The sounder policy must be that the

constitutional provision is self-executing, as so many other
states have held.
This

does

not

mean

that

the

Legislature

completely powerless to regulate such actions.

is

California

has always considered their constitutional provision, in its
essence

the

same

as

ours,

to

be

self-executing;

nevertheless, in a leading case, the California

Supreme

Court has stated that this constitutional right "is not
exempt from reasonable statutory regulations or enactments".
Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 725, 123 P.2d 505, 513 (1942).

The legislature is free to establish procedures for inverse
condemnation suits which "may tend to eliminate ill-founded
claims and discourage frivolous litigation" so long as the
right to compensation is not completely denied or abrogated.
Van Alstyne, OJD. cit. at 740.

To hold otherwise is to put

the constitutional right at the mercy of legislators who are
more interested in balancing the budget than in protecting
the

rights

of

citizens.

procedural requirements

Plaintiffs

have

met

of the Utah Governmental

all

the

Immunity

Act 5 and should be allowed to maintain their action solely
on the basis of Article I, Section 22.

POINT III
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 63-30-3 AND 63-30-9 ARE
IN CONFLICT AND SECTION 9, NOT SECTION 3,
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE INSTANT ACTION.
Plaintiffs based one claim for recovery on Utah
Code

Annotated

63-30-9.

The

Court

granted

defendant

a

summary judgment on this claim, finding that the claim was
barred by U.C.A. 63-30-3 as amended in 1984 and 1985.
amended,

U.C.A.

63-30-3

declares

governmental

As

entities

immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from
"the management of flood waters and other natural disasters
and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and
storm

systems...

."

Section

-17-

3,

as

amended,

directly

conflicts with Section 9, which states:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for any injury
caused from a dangerous or defective
condition
of any
public
building,
structure, dam, reservoir or other
public improvement.
Immunity is not
waived
for
latent
defective
conditions.,f

The Legislature

could have repealed

or amended

when they amended Section 3, but they did not.

Section 9
Therefore,

the inevitable conclusion is that Section 3 was not intended
to affect the waiver of

immunity

in

Section

9,

and

the

phrase at the beginning of Section 3, "Except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter..." modifies not just the
first sentence of the section but the whole of the U.C.A.
63-30-3.
Additionally, Section 3 as amended presumes that
the

damage

and

injury

resulting

from

the

activities

is

unavoidable, and occurs during or as a result of an unusual
and extreme natural phenomenon.
"and

other

natural

disasters"

The addition of the phrase
by

the

1985

Legislature

indicates the legislative intent to deal with unusual and
extreme conditions, not with a problem which arises several
times a year.

The problem experienced by the Hamblins has

occurred regularly, at times when no other storm sewer would
pose a problem.

In fact, the Hamblins had no such problem,

_ 1 ft_

even in the heaviest rainstorm, when there
sewer in place at all.

was no

storm

Not until the grade of the property

around them was changed
waters pose a problem.

for the new subdivision did rain
It is significant

that when the

Hamblins have experienced heavy flooding, their neighbors
have

had

no

problems.

Natural

phenomena

are

not

so

selective.
To

find

that

Section

3,

dealing

with

the

management of flood waters and the operation of flood and
storm systems, bars application of Section 9, referring to
"dams and reservoirs or other public
lead to a morass of inconsistency.
dams and reservoirs

improvements," could

For example, while most

in Utah are built

for water

storage

purposes, they must also serve flood control purposes.

If

water were to be rapidly drained out of a reservoir, causing
flooding downstream, and the State or a subdivision thereof
were found to have initiated the drainage. Section 9 would
allow recovery

for flood damage.

However,

if

Section 3

applied, the operators of the reservoir could claim to be
managing flood waters and claim immunity from suit.

Thus,

any public improvement which serves more than one function
could be immune from suit or not, depending on the function
the

improvement

Obviously,

served

in most

at

instances

the
it

time
would

of
be

the

injury.

impossible

to

determine what one function was being served at the time of

the injury.
Clearly,

U.C.A.

63-30-3

and

63-30-9

are

in

conflict, and Section 3 is overly broad for the purpose for
which it is intended.

The Legislature must have intended

Section 3 to apply only in extraordinary

circumstances,

while

to

Section

problems

9 would

which

improvements,
Hamblins.
action,

would

such

as

continue
arise
the

to apply

from
problems

the

use

all
of

experienced

other
public

by

the

The Court should apply Section 9 to the instant
until

the

Legislature

indicates

otherwise

by

amending or repealing Section 9.

POINT IV

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, SECTION 63-30-3, AS AMENDED
CANNOT CUT OFF PLAINTIFFS1 RIGHT TO COMPENSATION UNDER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

The Legislature cannot by statute abrogate a right
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution

of Utah.

Some

compensation must be made.

provision

for

recovery

of

But in 1984 and 1985, the Utah

Legislature attempted to deny this right of compensation by
amending Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 63-30-3 to read
in part:

?f

. . .The management of flood waters and

other

natural

disasters

and

the

construction, repair, and operation of
flood and storm systems by governmental
entities

are

considered

to

be

governmental functions, and governmental
entities

and

their

officers

and

employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage

resulting

from

those

activities.M

Insofar as this

statute

purports

to

cut

off Plaintiffs1

right to compensation without providing an alternate remedy
allowing Plaintiffs

to recover for their loss or forcing

Defendant City to condemn Plaintiffs1 house and property, it
is

overly

broad

Constitution.
Constitution

and

directly

conflicts

with

the

And since Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
refers

to damage

or

taking,

and

the

Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution refers only to
taking, while U.C.A.

63-30-3

as

amended

damage, the statute cannot abrogate

deals

Plaintiffs'

compensation for the taking of their property.

only

with

claim

to

As discussed

earlier, the substantial interference with the use of the
property

which

Plaintiffs

have

experienced

taking as defined in earlier cases.

amounts

to

a

Van

Alstyne

condemnation, which

has

stated:

fulfills

"The

law

constitutional

of

inverse

requirements,

has long been recognized as a fundamental exception to the
general

doctrine

of

governmental- tort

immunity."

Van

Alstyne, op. cit. at 728.

Webber v. Salt Lake City could

not

favor

have

applying

been

decided

in

this

principle

in

the

of

Mrs.

face

of

a

governmental immunity than applies today.
when

courts

agonized

over

the

Webber

without

more

strict

Even in a time

distinction

between

"proprietary" and "governmental" functions, the Utah Supreme
Court held simply on the basis of Article I, Section 22 of
the Utah

Constitution

compensation

that Mrs. Webber

for the substantial

was

entitled

to

interference with access

which she had suffered.
The Plaintiff

in the case of Reeder v. Brigham

City, supra, experienced flooding problems
Hamblins1.

similar to the

When a subdivision was built on land previously

used as an orchard, a drainage system was installed and Mr.
Reeder!s lands were flooded by spring runoff and after heavy
rains.

Like the Hamblins, Mr. Reeder

prior to construction of the drainage
subdivision.

The

Brigham City had
drainage

area

and

trial
diverted
forced

court

in

unable to handle the increased

water

never

flooded

system for the new

that

the waters
the

was

case

from
into

found

their
ditches

runoff, overflowed

that

natural
which,
causing

flooding of Mr. Reederfs property.

The Court affirmed an

injunction against Brigham City, saying Mr. Reeder nhas the
right to be free from receiving waters on his lands to his
damage which do not find their way in their natural course
and

under

natural

conditions." 413

P. 2d

300, 302.

The

Court, however, agreed with Brigham City's claim that it was
not

liable

for

damages

because

n

it

was

acting

in

a

governmental capacity'1, citing Cobia v. Roy City, 12 U.2d
375, 366 P.2d 986, (1961), as the basis for this ruling.
The Cobia decision, the sole ground for denial of
damages in Reeder, has since been overruled by Thomas v.
Clearfield
contrary

City,
to

Utah,

the

642

P.2d

definition

of

737

(1982),

as

governmental

enunciated by the Court in Standiford v.

Salt

being

function
Lake

City

Corp., Utah, 605 P.2d 1230 (1980) and reaffirmed in Johnson
v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 629 P.2d 432 (1981).
The current test for governmental
out

in

Standiford

is

"whether

the

immunity laid

activity

under

consideration is of such unique nature that it can only be
performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential
to

the

core

of

governmental

activity.fl

605 P. 2d 1230,

1236-1237*
The

Court

in Johnson

explained

that

this

test

"...does not refer to what government may do, but to what
government alone must do.?f

629 P.2d 432, 434.

Applying these tests to the operation of a sewer
system in Thomas v. Clearfield City, supra, the Court stated
that-

ff

the

operation

governmental

of

function

a

for

sanitary
purposes

sewer
of

system

the

is

a

municipality's

authority to operate, but it does not follow from this that
the

function

immunity

as

activity."
that

the

automatically
essential

to

qualifies

the

core

642 P. 2d 737, 739.
collection

and

for

governmental

the

governmental

of

The Court

disposal

of

then concluded

sewage

is

not

an

activity that government alone must do, and pointed out that
in many areas of the state, private entities perform this
function subject to government standards.
Likewise,

private

storm drainage systems.

entities

can

and

do

provide

Flood control is not an activity

that "government alone must dof!, and in fact eminent domain
power

is

authorized

entities

to

carry

control

does

not

out
meet

for

private

such
the

and

quasi-governmental

activities.
current

test

immunity; therefore, governmental immunity
defense to Plaintiffs' action.

Clearly,
of

flood

governmental

is not a valid

POINT V
SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE APPLIED
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 63-30-3
RETROACTIVELY TO BAR PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM?
Plaintiffs were first flooded in 1981, and the
damage for which they ask compensation began to accrue at
that same time.

"It is a rule of universal application that

a cause or right of action arises the moment an action may
be maintained to enforce it . . .

.If

Sweetser v. Fox, 43

Utah", 40 at 48, 134 P. 599 at 602 (1913).

This rule was

reaffirmed in Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah,
475, 25 P.2d 952 (1933); OfHair v. Kounalis, 23 U.2d 355,
463 P.2d 799 (1970); and Ash v. State, Utah, 572 P.2d 1374
(1977).
is

When this rule is applied to the instant action, it

clear

that

the

Plaintiffs'

claim

against

Defendant

Clearfield City arose in May, 1981, when they were first
flooded.
Although Defendant Clearfield City, directly or
through its insurer, reimbursed Plaintiffs for labor to
clean up after flooding, and for some work on the yard and
driveway. Plaintiffs have never been compensated

for the

permanent damage to their house and yard, and have never
been made whole.
The injury to their property is permanent, with
consequences which are expected to continue indefinitely,
and damages which are foreseeable.
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Therefore, this case is

properly a single action to recover all damages at once, and
the cause of action arose at the time of the first flooding.
Since the cause of action arose in 1981, Utah Code Annotated
Section

63-30-3

as

amended

applies

retroactively

to

bar

Plaintiffs1 claim if it applies at all.
Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-3 states:
part

of

these

revised

statutes

expressly so declared."

is

retroactive,

"No

unless

Therefore, in the absence of an

express directive in the statute, U.C.A. Section 63-30-3 as
amended should not be applied retroactively.
Frank v. State, Utah, 613 P.2d 517
faced with a similar claim:

In the case of

(1980), the Court was

that an earlier amendment to

U.C.A. Section 63-30-3 should be retroactively
bar a suit against the state.

applied to

The Court recognized

that

there, as here, there was language indicating a legislative
intent for retroactive application, but no such directive in
the statute
amendment

itself.

which

did

Rather
not

than
by

its

apply

retroactively

terms

require

an

such

retroactive application, the Court held that operation of
the University Medical Center was a governmental
"as

contemplated

by

the

statute

prior

to

function

amendment."

(Emphasis added).
The Court has already held that the operation of a
storm drainage system is a governmental function.
Brigham City, 17 U.2d 298, 413 P.2d 300 (1966).

Reeder v.

However, as

noted in Point IV above, the Court in Standiford v. Salt
Lake City, supra, has severely restricted the circumstances
under which a claim of governmental immunity for performance
of a governmental function will be allowed.

U.C.A. Section

Plaintiffs1

63-30-3 as it stood at the time

claim

arose

stated:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
act, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the
exercise
of
a
government
function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from
an
approved
medical,
nursing,
or
other
professional health care cliical training program
conducted in either public or private facilities.
Thus,

the

mere

fact

that

Defendant

was

performing

a

governmental function was not an absolute bar to a suit for
damages--the

legislature

immunity provided
functions,
63-30-8

such

and

for
as

has

allowed

governments

those

63-30-9.

performing

incorporated

But

the

exceptions

1984

in

to

the

governmental

U.C.A.

amendment

Section
to

U.C.A

Section 63-30-3, by creating an absolute bar and removing
those exceptions, cuts off any possibility of suit for some
pre-existing,

valid

claims.

In

the

absence

of

clear

language in the statute directing retroactive application,
the 1984 amendment should not be applied to a claim which
arose long before the amendment was conceived, and before
the

once-in-a-lifetime

statewide

flooding

occurred

which

prompted the amendment.

Far from

requiring

retroactive

application^ Frank v. State, supra, indicates that the Court
will be reluctant to apply any amendment to this statute
retroactively in the absence of an express direction to do
so.

POINT VI
DEFENDANT CLEARFIELD CITY SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY SINCE IT DID PAY SOME
DAMAGES AND ADMIT LIABILITY THROUGH OCTOBER, 1984, AND
PLAINTIFFS, ACTING IN RELIANCE ON DEFENDANT'S ACTION,
DELAYED FILING SUIT AGAINST DEFENDANT.

Defendant claims that its actions with reference
to the storm drainage system were a governmental function
under Reeder v. Brigham City, supra, and therefore, immune
from suit even before

the

Annotated Section 63-30-3.

1984 amendment

to Utah Code

If that is so, Clearfield City

would have been immune from suit for damages at all times
Plaintiffs were flooded.
or

through

Plaintiffs

its
for

Nevertheless, Defendant, directly

insurer,

paid

time, clean-up

invoices

and

some

presented
repairs

by

through

October 1984, including at least one payment for flooding
which occurred September 11, 1984, after the 1984 amendment
to Section 63-30-3 took effect, and made promises.

Record

pages 50-57.
Had the Plaintiffs filed suit against Clearfield

City when their claim first arose, their case would have
worked its way through the judicial system long before the
Utah Legislature considered the 1984 amendment.

Instead,

Plaintiffs relied on the Defendants pattern of continuing
payments and promises to correct the drainage problem, and
delayed filing suit, expecting

to be able to resolve the

problem with the City without resorting to legal action.
Defendant Clearfield

City, shoud not now be permitted to

argue that it is immune from suit and has been all along,
since

Plaintiffs

delayed

legal

action

in

an

attempt

to

settle with the City, and the City admitted liability for
the problem and paid some claims.

It will work manifest

injustice against Plaintiffs to allow Defendant to rely on
immunity at this late date, especially an absolute immunity
conferred by a statute passed long after the claim arose and
after Plaintiff had begun to work with Defendant to settle
the claim.

The Utah Supreme Court has refused to permit a

defense

govevernmental

of

inequitable to do so.

immunity

where

it

would

be

Bowles v. State of Utah, Utah, 652

P.2nd 1345 (1982); El Rancho Enterprises, Inc., v. Murray
City Corp., Utah, 565 P.2nd 778 (1977).

The Court in Reeder

v. Brigham City, supra, in affirming the injunction against
Brigham City, said that the Plaintiff

f,

has the right to be

free from receiving water on his land to his damage which do
not find their way in their natural course and under natural

-?Q-

conditions."

413 P.2nd at 302.

The Defendant Clearfield

City3 by its actions5 has shown it agrees with the Court in
Reeder, and should be estopped from claiming otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The law is clear that Plaintiffs are entitled to
compensation

from

Defendant

property has been so damaged
taken from them.

if5

as

they

that in effect

claim,

their

it has been

Governmental immunity in general and as

enacted in U.C.A. Section 63-30-3 as amended cannot bar this
right to compensation.

The Judgment should be reversed and

the case remanded for trial.
Respectfully

submitted

this

day

September, 1986.

KELLY G. CARDON
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS/
APPELLANTS

of
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correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Henry
Heath, Esq., Strong & Hanni, Attorneys at Law, Sixth Floor
Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 and to Bryan A. Larson, Esq., Christensen, Jensen &
Powell, Attorneys at Law, 900 Kearns Building, 136 South
Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this the
day of September', 1986, postage prepaid.
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH MICHAc' G AM pur« n co*

2xDDisrRTc>cbuRr
RICK HAMBLIN and
CHERLYNN HAMBLIN,

DEPUTY CLERh

:

Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULING ON MOTION FOR

CITY OF CLEARFIELD,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant•

Case No. 37210

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of December,
1985,

the Court having reviewed the file in the matter and the

Memorandums of counsel and having heard the arguments of counsel
and being fully advised in the premises hereby makes it ruling
as follows:
The Court hereby rules that §63-30-3 bars plaintiffs 1
cause of action for damages as against these defendants.
The Court does not reach the question of retroactivity
of §63-30-3 as the evidence is uncontroverted that any and all
claims of the plaintiffs were paid up through October of 1984
and that any cause of action of plaintiffs for damages arose
after that date.
The Court further rules that the City is not estopped
from asserting said section as a bar to any liability for reason
of its having paid claims of the plaintiffs which occured prior
to October of 1984.

FILMED
AfiniTMnTTM

A

(r>\r>rr>

A \

h

Ruling
#37210
Page
The Court does not reach the question of the unconstitutional taking raised by the plaintiff at the time of argument
as the same was not set forth in its original Complaint, but
will treat plaintiffs1 argument as a Motion to Amend the Complaint
to include a claim for unlawful taking.

The Court will grant

the motion and allow defendant ten (10) days to respond to the
Amended Complaint as to the unlawful taking.
DATED this

n ^

day of December, A.D., 1985.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Ruling to Kelly G. Cardon, Attorney for the
plaintiffs, 208% 25th Street, Ogden, Utah

84401 and to Mr. Henry

Heath, Attorney for the defendant, Sixth Floor Boston Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the
postage prepaid.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT AUri\!:.CLEPK
2 M : C!07.YiCf COURT

I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF D A V I S ,

vn£
CEi'Ui r CEito

STATE OF UT^EJ

RICK & CHERLYNN HAMBLIN, ,
RULING ON

Plaintiffs,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

Case No. 37210

CITY OF CLEARFIELD,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the above-entitled Court on defendant's second
Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Amended Complaint and
the Court being fully advised in the premises and having reviewed
memorandum of counsel submitted herein, hereby rules as follows:
First, as to plaintiff's motion to reconsider the Court's
prior partial summary judgment, the Court feels that Utah law and
the Rules of Procedure do not preclude the Court's consideration
of a motion to reconsider, but that any decision to reconsider
should be exercised by the Court with care and only in very
limited circumstances where new evidence or new law can be
presented which was not available at the initial hearing and
which could not have been known by counsel through the exercise
of reasonable diligence.

F,

L\1I=Q

ADDENDUM B (PAGE 1)

Such is not the case here and, therefore, the Court denies
the motion to reconsider its prior ruling granting the defendant
a partial summary judgment.
There remains the question of whether these plaintiffs may
maintain an action pursuant to Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution based upon their amended complaint.
Article I, Section 22 provides that property should not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.
The law seems clear in the State of Utah that Article I,
Section 22 is not self-executing and that in order for plaintiffs
to sue pursuant to that provision there must be legislative
authority for said action.

Such authority has been given in the

areas of eminent domain and in certain areas where governmental
immunity has been waived by statute under the Governmental
Immunity Act.
Under the facts of this case, the Court concludes that there
has been no taking by a governmental agency as is contemplated
under the eminent domain statute and therefore action thereunder
is not applicable; nor is this a case where the doctrine of
"inverse condemnation" would be applicable, in the limited scope
recognized by Utah Law.
The remaining question is whether immunity from suit has
been waived by the legislature under the Governmental Immunity
Act so as to allow suit to be filed.

Section 63-30-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953) was amended by
the legislature in 1984 so as to preclude specifically any
governmental liability arising out of management of flood
waters

. and the construction, repair, and operation of flood

and storm water system and specifically defines such activities
as governmental functions.
Prior to that enactment, cases involving governmental
immunity had turned on the question as to whether the particular
governmental activity was of such a unique nature that it could
only be performed by a governmental agency.
It appears from caselaw that the regulation of storm water
was and is such an activity.

The legislative enactment in 1984

as to storm water appears to be merely a codification of prior
case law.
The court therefore concludes that Section 63-10-3 as
amended precludes plaintiff's action in this particular case and
rather than authorizing action pursuant to Article I, Section 22
in fact precludes it.

Further that since the amendment to

Section 63-10-3 is merely a codification of prior caselaw, said
section so far as it applies to storm waters should be applied
retroactive.
Insofar as it may appear that Section 63-10-13 as amended
may be in conflict with Section 63-10-9, since 63-10-13 is the
later pronouncement by the legislature, any conflict between the
two sections must be resolved in favor of the former section.
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Based upon the foregoing, defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment on plaintiff's Amended Complaint is hereby granted.
DATED this

2 9 ^ day of April, A.D. 1986.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE"
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Ruling to Kelly Cardon, 427 27th, Ogden, Utah
84401 and to Mr. Henry Heath, Sixth Floor Boston Building, 9
Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on the <§t?U day of
April, 1986, postage prepaid.
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Deputy Clerk

<^

'T^J2^-

DAVIS CrlJiifi:nfAH

BE JIM 2 5 AH $ 1 9
MCH/«CLG -iLLPFIH.CLEPK

Henry E. Heath
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080

*soe.orRicr

COURT"

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICK HAMBLIN and
CHERLYN HAMBLIN,
Plaintiffs,

]
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING
> PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

vs.
1 Civil No. 37,210
CITY OF CLEARFIELD,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for hearing on defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment with the initial hearing being held
on the 12th day of December, 1985, before the above-entitled
court with the Honorable Rodney F. Page, District Judge, presiding.
The parties were represented by counsel of record.

The court having

reviewed the Memoranda of the parties and having heard arguments
of counsel, ruled that plaintiffs' cause of action for damages
against defendant was barred by §63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated,
and reserved its ruling on certain other issues and granted
plaintiffs the right to amend their Complaint.
Whereupon plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint to which

FiL'.:zD
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defendant filed an Answer and moved the court for a second time
to grant its Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs1
Amended Complaint,

The court received additional Memoranda and

held a further hearing with counsel for the parties present.
Whereupon the court ruled that §63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated,
as amended in 1984 should be applied retro-actively to bar plaintiffs1
claim and that said statute is not a violation of Article 1,
§22 of the Utah Constitution.
NOW THEREFORE, the court being fully advised in the premises
and based upon the foregoing and having specifically found that there
is no genuine issue of fact

and that defendant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law, the court does hereby
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that plaintiffs1 Complaint against
defendant be and the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice, with
no costs awarded.
DATED this

2.3^

day of June, 1986.
BY THE COURT

D
J^J
Rodney St Page
DistritH: Judge
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ADDENDUM D
STATUTES
U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment provides as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
U. S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment in Section 1
provides as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22 provides as
follows:
Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
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Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 63-30-3, as amended,
provides as follows:
Except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from
suit for any.injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing
home, or other governmental health care
facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health
care clinical training program conducted
in either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters
and other natural disasters and the
construction, repair, and operation of
flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be
governmental functions, and governmental
entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those
activities.
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 63-30-8, provides as
follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused
by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous
condition of any highway, road, street,
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other
structure located thereon.
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 63-30-9, provides as
follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused
from a dangerous or defective condition
of any public building, structure, dam,
reservoir or other public improvement.
Immunity is not waived for latent
defective conditions.
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Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 68-3-3, provides as
follows:
No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so
declared.
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